New Guide for Security by Design in Advanced Nuclear Facilities
1. Scope
1.1 This guide will serve as a practical document for designers, vendors, constructors, and other stakeholders of advanced nuclear facilities that will:
1.1.1 Explain the concept of security by design (SeBD) in the context of nuclear security, and convey the need for SeBD and the risks of not adequately addressing security needs early in the design phase;
1.1.2 Define and describe key terms and concepts used in SeBD;
1.1.3 Enable vendors to integrate security considerations in to the facility’s design features with the aim of reducing or mitigating the risk of sabotage of facilities or theft of materials.
1.2 This guide identifies best practices during the design process that will result in a robust and fit-for-purpose approach for physical protection systems, cyber security, insider threat mitigation, and nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC). Checklists will be included to facilitate identification of needed features and how they could be implemented.
1.3 This guide does not address requirements for safety or international safeguards practices but recognizes the importance of the integration of safety, international safeguards, and security. This guide does not supersede applicable regulations or codes.
1.4 Concepts described in this guide can also be applicable to other types of nuclear facilities.
1.5 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety and health practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.
1.6 This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles for the Development of international Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
The United States and other countries intend to develop and deploy advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMR) as part of an overall strategy to triple nuclear energy capacity globally by 2050. Security considerations for A/SMR differ from those of traditional nuclear power plants (NPPs). Because A/SMR use fewer on-site personnel than traditional NPPs, there could be an increased vulnerability of A/SMRs to threat or sabotage. This standard will serve as a one-stop guidance document to address security needs early in the design process.
