

# **From Science to Engineering Practice - Evolving a Structural Integrity Framework**

**ASTM 2016 Fatigue Lecture**

**Jerzy Komorowski**

**with David Hoepfner and Min Liao**



To my HOListic Structural Integrity Process (HOLSIP)  
co-conspirators

# Content

- HOLSIP - why “conspiracy”?
- About NRC and our collaborators
- We are still learning the hard way
- Engineering and Science
- HOLSIP the framework
- Selected Applications
- Future – the unfinished business

# HOLSIP – why ‘conspiracy’



# “Conspiracy” – collaboration of boondoggle bunch`

- In early 2000's word 'holistic' was associated with alternative (not science based) medicine rather than with:
  - ***Holistic = Emphasizing the importance of the whole and the interdependence of its parts.***
  - USAF was no longer interested in funding the core members: U. Utah (D. Hoepfner), APES Inc. (C. Brooks) and NRC (JPK and N. Bellinger)
- 2002 The series of annual HOLSIP workshops was launched = boondoggles
- 2016 – February 21-26 – 15<sup>th</sup> HOLSIP workshop was held at Snowbird Utah.

# NRC and collaborators



National Research  
Council Canada

Conseil national  
de recherches Canada

**Canada** 

# HOLSIP workshop attendees

- Australia, North America, Asia (Japan), Europe
- Air forces (5), Industry (OEM 4, MRO, other), Airworthiness, Safety, RTO (5), University (6)
- Research, Technology Development, Product Development, Sustainment (MRO),

Aircraft airframes and engines,  
pipelines, civil structures




HOLSIP 15 (2016)

# University of Utah / FASIDE



# About NRC



- Approx. \$900M budget
- **3,670** employees and **575** volunteer and independent visitors
- Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) supports a variety of disciplines and services in support of industry
- Research facilities provide strategic research & development and technical services to national and international clients

- ▼ IRAP
- Research facilities
- ⊕ Aerospace research facilities

# Facilities – \$500M Research Infrastructure



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[vision](#)

[projects](#)

[personnel](#)

[resources](#)

AP/ES consists of former aerospace OEM and government engineers with over 75 years collective experience in the aerostructures industry.



## Contact

AP/ES, Inc.  
6669 Fyler Avenue  
Saint Louis, MO 63139

314.644.6040 (tel)  
314.644.1309 (fax)

[Email](#)  
[Printable Map](#)

## Fatigue & Fracture

AP/ES has diverse expertise in disciplines such as damage tolerance, crack nucleation, durability, corrosion fatigue, [holistic life assessments](#), [spectrum analysis](#) and generation, and [mechanical testing](#).

## Process Development and Automation

Software developers with extensive engineering experience can create [custom solutions](#) to meet a customers' needs. Automating repetitive analytical tasks, parsing and evaluating results, linking and porting software, and developing specialized programs, macros, and reports are all day-to-day examples.

## Stress & Failure Analyses

Experienced aircraft stress analysts, [finite-element modeling](#) specialists, microstructure experts, and unique [fractography capabilities](#) get to the root causes of your engineering problems.

## Service Life Assessments



Using advanced and existing technologies, AP/ES and strategic partners can provide customers with [criticality overviews](#) and specific [structural integrity evaluations](#) tailored to their unique structural systems and fleets. Assessments address the impacts of maintenance and inspection programs on cost, fleet readiness, and structural safety.

**We are still learning the hard way**



# No-Life Paradigm

- Between May 1953 and April 1954, three *Comet aircraft* disintegrated in flight, after which all Comet 1 aircraft were withdrawn from service.
- Afterwards a full-scale test was carried out in which the fuselage was submerged in water to simulate the pressurization cycles.
- From the resulting cracks, the relevant fuselage piece of a failed aircraft was recovered from the ocean floor, which showed the "unmistakable fingerprint of fatigue".
- Fatigue cracks due to the stress concentration at nearly-square rear window cutouts caused failures.



# Safe-Life Paradigm

- RB211 SITUATION ON THE LOCKHEED TRISTAR (1972, 1973)
  - Two in-flight first stage fan discs burst. One in Dec., 1972 (six days before EA 901), second Jan. 12, 1973-TWA 28
  - No fatalities, but all IMI 685 fan and compressor discs replaced by RR and Lockheed.




RB211, L1011-TWA 28

# Safe-Life Paradigm

- UA 232-DC10 ACCIDENT  
SIOUX CITY, IOWA (1989)
  - In flight compressor fan disc failure of CF6-6 engine. 113 fatalities. 171 survived.
  - Previous spool failures had occurred (different Ti alloy but same basic problem).
  - Sister discs were cracked.



# Damage Tolerance (Metals)



- ALOHA AIRLINES 243 ACCIDENT (1988)
  - The aircraft lost 1/3 of its crown due to a stress fracture while cruising at 24,000 feet. 1 fatality.

# Damage Tolerance (Metals)

- CAUSE OF SOUTHWEST B733 NEAR YUMA (2011)
  - MISALIGNED rivet holes where two parts of the fuselage were assembled.
  - Wear-induced cracks
  - Riveted joints that failed were not extensively checked because they were thought not to be susceptible to fatigue.



# Damage Tolerance (Composites)

- AIR TRANSAT AIRBUS A310  
C-GPAT
  - On 6th of March, 2005, over international waters a rudder detached from the vertical stabilizer.
  - Rudder is an all-composite structure consisting of two sandwich panels, hinge side spar, top and bottom ribs.
  - “No-Growth” design



# Engineering and Science



# Engineering is not science, it is art

- Practitioners do not see themselves as creative artists pushing the boundaries of possibility




Aircraft Art, Forte di Belvedere  
Florence, Italy

# Damage Tolerance (Composites)


Tests form the basis for validating no-growth approach to damage tolerance requirements but assumes that all damage modes are known.

- Must show catastrophic failure due to fatigue, environmental effects, manufacturing defects, or accidental damage will be avoided throughout the operational life of the aircraft.
- Extent of analysis or tests will depend upon applicable previous fatigue/damage tolerant designs, construction, tests, and service experience on similar structures. (When will this happen given the tailored design of composite structures)




# Composites - fatigue

- No-life **AGAIN!!!!?**
- Service experience
  - Low strain levels ( $<4,000\mu\epsilon$ )
  - Older materials
  - Conclusion – fatigue resistant materials
- Lab experience
  - Small coupons
  - Specimen geometry – edge problem
  - Long period without evident damage – low number of cycles to failure when damage can be observed
- Large transport composite wing weight saving requires higher strains closer to  $6,000\mu\epsilon$ ?



# Composite Materials

- Physics based models (degradation, strength, failure) are still needed and not yet available.



## NASA-Led Consortium Will Bring Science To Art Of Composites


[Aviation Week & Space Technology](#)

[Graham Warwick](#)


Mon, 2015-04-27 04:00

# Metal fatigue more unfinished business

- Early stages not well modeled:
  - dichotomy between Durability and DT
  - EIFS problematic, post-diction
  - “initiation” concept
- Environments not considered



**Discontinuity**  
**Heterogeneity**



# NRC Aerospace Aging Aircraft Specimen Library



Microsoft Internet Explorer  
Address: http://32.246.33.13/airsearch.asp

### Aircraft Specimen Library - Search

Aircraft Model	Aircraft ID	Specimen ID
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

Specimen Source:  
Specimen Location:   
Type: Striker #:  Lower Striker #:   
Start Body Station:  End Body Station:

Joint & Fastener:  
Fastener Type:  Joint Type:   
 Bolt  Longitudinal  
 Flush  Crossed/Forward  
 Forwarding  Stagger  
 Steel

Specimen Properties:  
 Bent  
 Banded  
 Substructure  
 Repair  
 Disassembled  
 Reassembled  
 Failed  
 Fracture


Crack Layer:   
Corrosion Type:   
In Library:

Inspection:  
 D-Sight Inspection  
 Eddy Current  
 Microscopic Inspection  
 Shadow Moire Inspection  
 Ultrasonic Inspection  
 X-Ray Inspection  
 Visual Inspection  
 Has Disassembly History  
 Other Types of Inspection

Clear Filter Search More Menu


# Lap Joint Specimen Teardown

47-18A, Boeing 727-200 N4747, S4R - BS1020




- Upper rivet row inner skin, faying surface.
- Dark areas contain ~10% thickness loss maximum.
- Cracks in the areas adjacent to maximum corrosion pilling.

X-ray images




# Fatigue and Corrosion Pillowing






Fatigue striations  
along crack front




Intergranular  
fracture




Pillowing cracks found in 10  
different a/c from 3  
manufactures



# Effect of Corrosion on Stress



- Finite element models generated with and without thickness loss.
- Results show strains significantly increase due to pillowing as compared to thickness loss effect.





# HOLSIP the framework




## In the absence of physics based failure models

- Each time new material is introduced – new black box to build structures from
- Old approaches to support SI – bound by assumptions known to retired practitioners and typically based on simple strain analysis
- Start again with each generation – typically only one new platform designed in 20 years

### Holistic:

emphasizing the importance of the whole and the interdependence of its parts

# Holistic structural integrity Process (HOLSIP)



**HOLSIP framework:** to currently augment *safe-life* and *damage tolerant* paradigms with the *ultimate* goal to evolve HOLSIP into a new paradigm for both design and sustainment engineering

**Key elements:** physics & probabilistic models, loads monitoring, environmental effects, advanced NDE/SHM, and risk assessment.

**Developers:** NRC, APES, U. Utah, Tri/Austin, AFRL/USAF, JAXA ...


# Holistic structural integrity Process (HOLSIP)



\*HOLSIP terminology

# Major HOLSIP Related Tasks at NRC





- **Physics modeling:** crack nucleation, short crack, environment/corrosion composite age degradation, new manufacturing, new material)
- **Residual stress** measuring/modeling, new joining tech.
- Structural health monitoring (**SHM**) and test integration
- **Advanced NDI** and modeling
- **Risk/reliability** toolbox (including MSD/WFD)
- **Certification/qualification** testing



Risk/reliability quantified total life assessment considering both cyclic and environment related loading

# Initial Discontinuity States (Material Characterization)

**Initial Discontinuity States (IDS):** Initial population of discontinuities that are in a structure made of a given material as it was manufactured in a given geometric form



**IDS examples:** particles, pores, machining marks/scratches

IDS fatigue subset measured from fracture surfaces **ARC-CMRC**




# Correlation between overall IDS distribution and its fatigue subsets

**Extreme value model:** IDS fatigue subset is in the right tail of the overall IDS distribution, which can be determined using the extreme value theory in the highest (95%) stress region, ex. Lognormal (overall IDS) → Frechet (IDS subset).

$$F_s(x) = \exp\left[-\left(\frac{a}{x-\tau}\right)^b\right], x \geq 0, a, b > 0$$

$$a = \exp\left[\sigma\sqrt{2\ln(N_s)} - \sigma\left[\frac{\ln(\ln(N_s)) + \ln(4\pi)}{2\sqrt{2\ln(N_s)}}\right]\right] + \mu$$


$$b = \frac{\sqrt{2\ln(N_s)}}{\sigma}$$




**Model and test results for crack-nucleating particle (area) for 7050**

# IDS Study for New Material 7249-T76511

## Microstructural analysis: **IDS (initial discontinuity states)** study




a) L-T plane



b) S-T plane

- The analysis showed that the 7249 alloy has finer microstructures, especially smaller particles, compared to the legacy 7075-T6 material (from a previous CFSD), providing some physics for explaining the near-threshold FCGR difference between these two materials

# Probabilistic Short Crack Modeling (CTOD based)




**$a - N$  results for 2024-T351(SENT)**

**Analysis ( $a_0$ : IDS/particle) vs. Test (AGARD 1982)**

# Quantify Residual Stress Effect on Crack Growth using ACR Technique

- The adjusted compliance ratio (ACR), developed by K. Donald, is an experimental method for estimating  $\Delta K_{\text{eff}}$ .
- The ACR method intends to measure the crack closure effect below the 2% crack-opening load, and **quantify the remote closure effect induced by residual stress (from forging or welding)**



$$\Delta K_{\text{ACR}} = \text{ACR} \cdot \Delta K_{\text{app}}$$

where

$$\text{ACR} = \frac{\Delta \delta_{\text{cl}} - \Delta \delta_{\text{i}}}{\Delta \delta_{\text{nc}} - \Delta \delta_{\text{i}}}$$

or

$$C = \delta / P$$

$$\text{ACR} = \frac{C_s - C_i}{C_o - C_i}$$



Source: K. Donald, What is ACR?

# Record of Airworthiness Risk Management (RARM, RCAF, 2003)

- Hazard Id. → Risk Ass.(RA) → Risk Ctrl. → RARM Approval → Risk Tracking
- Affecting all RCAF air fleets (DND-AD-2007-01)

## Quantitative vs. Qualitative risk index

Effect Severity \ HAZARD PROBABILITY	Catastrophic Category A	Hazardous (Severe Major) Category B	Major Category C	Minor Category D	Negligible Category E
Frequent All $>10^{-3}$ UAV $<10^{-2}$	A1 - Extremely High	B1 - Extremely High	C1 - Medium	D1 - Low	E1
Reasonably Probable All $<10^{-3}$ UAV $<10^{-2}$	A2 - Extremely High	B2 = High	C2 - Low	D2	E2
Remote Civil $<10^{-5}$ Military $<10^{-5}$ Military (E-seat) $<10^{-4}$ UAV $<10^{-3}$	A3 = High	B3 = Medium	C3	D3	E3
Extremely Remote Civil $<10^{-7}$ Military $<10^{-6}$ Military (E-seat) $<10^{-5}$ UAV $<10^{-4}$	A4 = Medium	B4	C4	D4	E4
Extremely Improbable Civil $<10^{-9}$ Military $<10^{-8}$ Military (E-seat) $<10^{-7}$ UAV $<10^{-4}$	A5	B5	C5	D5	E5


**Risk (Safety) Thresholds**

- Civil Derivative A/C
- Military A/C
- Military A/C with Ejection Seats
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

**Within Accepted Level of Safety  
(Basis of Certification)**

TAM, C-05-005-001/AG-001,  
DTAES/DND, 2001

# Holistic Structural Integrity Process (HOLSIP) for Composites/Hybrids



**Structural integrity** is the condition which exists when a structure is sound and unimpaired in providing the desired level of structural safety, performance, durability, and supportability (MIL-STD-1530/USAF ASIP)

# HOLSIP 15 NRC Progress Report - Feb 2016


NRC-CNRC

## Overview of Some Recent Structural Integrity Research at NRC

Min Liao

Thrust Lead  
Air Defence Systems (ADS) Program

HOLSIP 15  
Snowbird,  
February 21-23, 2016

 National Research Council Canada / Conseil national de recherches Canada

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

- Relevance to HOLSIP
  - NRC HOLSIP framework
- Progress of Full-Scale Testing Research (*skip here*)
- Progress of Aircraft Lifting Research
- Progress of Fatigue Enhancement Research
- Progress of SHM Research
- Progress of NDE Research
- Progress of Composite Research (*skip here*)
- Summary

# Selected Applications




# Corrosion Fatigue Holistic Analysis for F-18 Longeron

2932 simulated flight hours in full scale test



side view of longeron at crack nucleation site by replica




DDT analyses do not generally include possibility of change of criticality of structure – from durability to DT driven.

**Corrosion can have such impact.**

# Advanced Damage Tolerant and Risk Analysis Tools Developed under HOLSIP Framework


- NRC developed advanced DTA and risk analysis tools (CanGROW, ProDTA) under HOLSIP framework
- NRC tools provided significant support to risk-based management for various RCAF aircraft fleets



Risk analysis to determine the service life limit of CC-130 center wing with MSD/MED


(Liao, Renaud, Bombardier ICAF2015)

# CP-140 Aurora 7249-T76511 Aluminium Material Testing



## Technical Highlights

M(T) Test Trials (under DRDC Project)



**Objectives:** Obtain additional Al7249-T76511 material property data to support RCAF for decision-making on ASIP and reduction on maintenance cost by refining the material models of the CP-140. Required data includes:



- Fracture toughness for thin extrusions ( $K_{IC}$ )
- Fatigue crack growth rate (FCGR) properties for negative and high stress ratios ( $R$ ).

## Outcomes



- Fracture toughness for 4 different material thicknesses (20 coupons total; 5 replicates).
- Fatigue crack growth rate (FCGR) test data for two positive and two negative stress ratios (12 coupons total)

**Partnership/Leveraging:** IMP Aerospace, Lockheed Martin, P-3 ASIWG, DRDC

## Fracture toughness test design (E561)





# Validation and Transfer of Cold-Work (CW) Modeling Technology (FY15-16)



## Technical Highlights

- Brief Review of RCAF, USN, and USAF Practice
- USAF Residual Stress Database Investigation
- NRC Cold Expansion Simulation (3D FE)
- NRC Crack Growth Simulation, evaluating CPAT and BAMF







## Objective:

Improve and validate methods/tools to determine practical Cold Work (CW) Life Improvement Factors (LIF) using 2D and 3D simulation, and residual stress database.




## Background:

NRC and IMP recently completed cold worked hole tests for two locations of the new 7249 Al CP-140 wing (ASLEP). The LIFs determined in the lab (ideal conditions) need to be reduced to reflect in-service experience and conditions.

Partnership/Leveraging: IMP, P-3 ASIWG, USN, USAF, RMC



# Additive Repair Technology Development Program – Cold Spray



## Milestones

1. Evaluation of sprayed material strengths vs requirements
2. Selection of suitable repair alloy for 7075 forgings
3. Development and initial test of a repair process
4. Exposure and durability testing of repair components
5. Completion of the test program
6. Delivery of repair scheme

## Deliverables / Outputs

1. Repair material compatibility report
2. Program tests report
3. Additive repair scheme for 7075 forgings.

## Technical Highlights

Sprayed density looks promising for 7075  
Property testing to commence early Feb



## Objective:

The objective of this project is to develop an additive material (Cold Spray) repair capability for the Canadian Forces. The research focus is the restoration of parts reworked (blended) beyond current repair limits.

## Background:

Cold Spray is a metal spray process typically used to deposit a sacrificial layer of metal on a component for corrosion protection. Recent developments such as hand held kits, improved materials and processes has opened the possibility of using this technology for structural repair on aircraft.

## Impact/Benefit/Return on Investment:

The impact is significant. Additive manufacturing processes have the potential to eliminate the costly replacement of frames and fittings, such as the CH124 Sponsor attachment fitting and the CH149 Main landing gear frames. Potential savings are likely to exceed several million dollars

# Discussion Paper on Certification of Additive Manufactured (AM) Components

**Objective:** *To prepare a discussion paper on certification of additive manufactured (AM) components. This paper will highlight the concerns relating to AM and the possible solutions that will allow these manufactured parts to be certified.*

**Background:** *AM is one of the most important technology trends in aerospace and defence. However, there are many issues/challenges for applying AM on primary aircraft structures/critical parts, one of them is the quantification and certification..*

**Impact/Benefit:** *Discussion paper documenting the major issues/concerns relating to the certification of AM components*

**Return on Investment:** *Increase fleet availability, reduce maintenance cost.*



RR501 fuel nozzle repair



**Client(s):** DND, DTAES 7-2

**Sponsor(s):** DTAES 7-2

**Notes/Comments:**

## Technical Tasks

1. *Identify possible certification issues relating to additive manufactured components, such as quality, repeatability and residual stresses.*
2. *Support TTCP AER TP4, SA 4B.5, and coordinate with TTCP AER TP-4, MAT TP-1 and MAT TP-5*

## Milestones

1. *Review, gather information, draft report* 03/16
2. *Update draft paper with DND and TTCP data* 11/16

## Deliverables/Outputs

- Preliminary draft of discussion paper on Mar-16
- Final report on Nov-16

## Technical Highlights

TTCP presentation and Draft report discussing

- major concerns/issues
- recommendation on R&D

# Future – the unfinished business



## Quo Vadimus?

- Concern – new generation of practitioners (OEMs) do not seem to participate in information exchanges as the previous generation did.
  - “This is a secret” and “We are the best!” – syndrome?
- So much yet to be learned.
- Capture and share – open “learning” systems needed.
- Importance of standards and definitions.
- Will this ‘SI business’ ever be finished?

# Black Swan

- Do we understand the risks?

NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER  
THE  
BLACK SWAN



The Impact of the  
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE

"the most prophetic voice of all!"  
—GQ

Nassim Nicholas Taleb



The Impact of the  
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE

Thank you

